| ID | 091865 |
| Title Proper | U.S. policy toward North Korea |
| Other Title Information | where to go next? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Cossa, Ralph A |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | President Obama offered to extend a hand to those who were "willing to unclench [their] fist," and promised a clear, consistent, cooperative, and consultative approach to achieve Korean peninsula denuclearization. Unfortunately, Pyongyang chose not to cooperate, deciding instead to challenge the new American leader, in the form of a "satellite launch" that created a crisis where none would have otherwise existed. The reasons why Pyongyang chose to go down this path remain open to wide speculation. But the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and others must now assume that Pyongyang has made the "strategic decision" not to give up its nuclear weapons and must now deal with this reality. What is needed now is a clearly expressed policy of containment aimed at keeping what is in North Korea in North Korea and which keeps out anything else that would help the regime develop its nuclear or missile capabilities. This does not mean that Washington is prepared to recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. The goal still remains the complete, verifiable, irreversible elimination of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons capabilities. The United States does recognize that this will be a multi-stage process and that counter-proliferation is a major step in this process. So is tightening the noose around Pyongyang to increase the political, military, and economic costs associated with going down the nuclear path. |
| `In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 21, No. 3; Sep 2009: p.265 - 277 |
| Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 21, No. 3; Sep 2009: p.265 - 277 |
| Key Words | North Korea ; United States ; Denuclearization ; Pyongyang ; Nuclear ; Nuclear Weapons ; Military |