| ID | 092314 |
| Title Proper | Unnecessary or unsung? the utilisation of airpower in Britain's colonial counterinsurgencies |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Mumford, Andrew |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Making extensive use of primary archival documents, this article seeks to explore whether airpower in three of Britain's most significant post-war colonial counterinsurgency campaigns, Malaya, Kenya and South Arabia, was an unnecessary part of British strategy, offering little useful military force due to the futility and strategic damage rendered by offensive bombardment, or whether airpower was indeed an unsung factor that provided operational flexibility through its effectiveness in a supply context, as well as its intelligence role in providing valuable aerial reconnaissance. In all three case studies the role played by the RAF in medical evacuations, in troop drops, in crop spraying during food-denial initiatives, and in providing 'Voice Aircraft' for the propaganda campaign, provide insights into an under-explored component of Britain's politico-military efforts in counterinsurgency in the 1950s and 1960s and suggests that the main strategic value of airpower in counterinsurgency, then and now, lies in its non-kinetic functions. |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 20, No. 3-4; Sep-Dec 2009: p.636 - 655 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 20, No. 3-4; Sep-Dec 2009: p.636 - 655 |
| Key Words | Counterinsurgency ; Airpower ; Malaya ; Kenya ; South Arabia ; Strategy ; Utility of History |