| ID | 092565 |
| Title Proper | Strategic voting in plurality elections |
| Other Title Information | a simulation of duverger's law |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Endersby, James W ; Shaw, Kelly B |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Experiments designed as an election simulation involve participants in an investigation of strategic voting. Participants assigned political preferences and informed of candidate/party positions on an ideological dimension respond to and learn the results of two public opinion polls before voting. When given two alternatives, the participants vote sincerely. Confronted with three or more alternatives, participants make tactical decisions to narrow the field. Strategic behavior quickly reduces the number of alternatives to two. Consistent with Duverger's law, candidate/party viability encourages strategic voting and the development of a two-party system. The election simulation serves as a useful tool to teach about electoral behavior and to explore topics such as strategic voting. |
| `In' analytical Note | Political Science and Politics Vol. 42, No. 2; Apr 2009: p393-399 |
| Journal Source | Political Science and Politics Vol. 42, No. 2; Apr 2009: p393-399 |
| Key Words | Voting ; Plurality ; Elections ; Simulations ; Law |