| ID | 093026 |
| Title Proper | Myth of military myopia |
| Other Title Information | democracy, mmall wars, and Vietnam |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Caverley, Jonathan D |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | A capital- and firepower-intensive military doctrine is, in general, poorly suited for combating an insurgency. It is therefore puzzling that democracies, particularly the United States, tenaciously pursue such a suboptimal strategy over long periods of time and in successive conflicts. This tendency poses an empirical challenge to the argument that democracies tend to win the conflicts they enter. This apparently nonstrategic behavior results from a condition of moral hazard owing to the shifting of costs away from the average voter. The voter supports the use of a capital-intensive doctrine in conflicts where its effectiveness is low because the decreased likelihood of winning is out-weighed by the lower costs of fighting. This theory better explains the development of the United States' counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam during Lyndon Johnson's administration compared to the dominant interpretation, which blames the U.S. military's myopic bureaucracy and culture for its counterproductive focus on firepower and conventional warfare. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Security Vol. 34, No. 3; Win 2010: p119-157 |
| Journal Source | International Security Vol. 34, No. 3; Win 2010: p119-157 |
| Key Words | Myth ; Military ; Myopia ; Small War ; Democracy ; Vietnam |