| ID | 094885 |
| Title Proper | Dynamic pricing in the spanish gasoline market |
| Other Title Information | a tacit collusion equilibrium |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Garcia, Jordi Perdiguero |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | During the last twenty years, the Spanish petrol market has undergone an intensive restructuration process; it has changed from being a state-owned monopoly to total liberalization and privatization. This liberalization process was accompanied by measures that facilitated the creation of a "national champion," the Repsol Group, which is a huge, vertically integrated company with a high market share in all the industry's segments. Using a dynamic model, this paper analyses whether the prices established by companies in the Spanish gasoline market, after the restructuration process, fits with a tacit collusion equilibrium. The empirical results show that a strategic behaviour of companies occurs and is compatible with a tacit collusion price strategy. So, the restructuration process does not seem to have introduced effective competition into the Spanish gasoline market. |
| `In' analytical Note | Energy Policy Vol. 38, No. 4; Apr 2010: p1931-1937 |
| Journal Source | Energy Policy Vol. 38, No. 4; Apr 2010: p1931-1937 |
| Key Words | Gasoline Market ; Collusion ; Dynamic Games |