| ID | 095533 |
| Title Proper | Vacillating between revolution and detente |
| Other Title Information | Mao's changing psyche and policy toward the United States, 1969-1976 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Yang, Kuisong ; Xia, Yafeng |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | After nearly twenty-two years of confrontation and hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), U.S. president Richard Nixon made his historic trip to China and met with Chinese supreme leader Mao Zedong in February 1972. Nixon's one week in China represented a profound turning point in U.S.-China relations. The historic Nixon-Mao handshake stood as a great diplomatic victory for Beijing as well. The Chinese leaders could now focus their attention on the Soviet threat and avoid fighting a possible two-front war. A Chinese Communist party (CCP) Central Committee (CC) document hailed the summit for its success in "utilizing [others'] contradictions, dividing up enemies, and enhancing ourselves," and credited this to Mao's "brilliant decision" to invite the U.S. president.1 Nixon and Mao have often been given credit for achieving U.S.-China rapprochement in the early 1970s. Was Mao really a realistic leader as many have suggested? |
| `In' analytical Note | Diplomatic History Vol. 34, No. 2; Apr 2010: p.395-423 |
| Journal Source | Diplomatic History Vol. 34, No. 2; Apr 2010: p.395-423 |
| Key Words | Mao ; United States - 1969-1976 ; Richard Nixon ; China ; U S - China Relations ; Beijing ; Chinese Domestic Politics ; Soviet Union ; United States - 1969–1976 |