| ID | 095998 |
| Title Proper | Parsing Pyongyang's strategy |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Roy, Denny |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | North Korean behaviour that appears intended to raise tensions with Pyongyang's adversaries is not only vexing but puzzling. The North Koreans periodically throw up obstacles to the economic cooperation their country desperately needs, including harassment of the joint North-South industrial zone in Kaesong. Pyongyang often speaks as if it welcomes a fight with the United States and South Korea, its strongest potential adversaries. With its second nuclear test in May 2009, Pyongyang clearly angered even its important partner China, a major supplier of such basic needs as food and energy. If fear of aggression by the United States and its allies is a principal driver of North Korean foreign policy, why do the North Koreans frequently risk providing the putatively aggressive Americans further motivation to attack? Some observers argue, for example, that transfer of nuclear material or technology is extremely unlikely because Pyongyang is deterred from crossing what is clearly a red line for the United States that would bring massive military retaliation. Yet North Korean officials have more than once threatened to cross that line, seemingly for the purpose of frightening the Americans by playing on one of their worst fears. |
| `In' analytical Note | Survival : the IISS Quarterly Vol. 52, No. 1; Feb-Mar 2010: p.111-136 |
| Journal Source | Survival : the IISS Quarterly Vol. 52, No. 1; Feb-Mar 2010: p.111-136 |
| Key Words | North Korean ; Pyongyang ; Pyongyang's Strategy ; United States ; South Korea ; North Korean Foreign Policy ; China |