| ID | 096665 |
| Title Proper | Space and deterrence |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Coletta, Damon |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Regardless of whether the United States decides to extend deployment of its weaponry beyond land, sea, and air to the medium of outer space, military dependence on assets stationed between low Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit for communication, navigation, and surveillance will likely remain high. Deterrence as a strategy to protect these assets carries with it the risk that a crisis over satellites will escalate out of control. Nevertheless, when evaluated against other options on the agenda-such as space control and space avoidance-it is the only strategy for which the United States is currently equipped militarily and politically. In order to mitigate the downsides of deterrence, in particular to stave off a decision that would require disproportionate retaliation, the new United States Administration is likely to mix in tactical elements of control and avoidance. These elements, however, will not subvert deterrence as a core strategy, nor will they obviate uncomfortable and undemocratic compromises that have marked deterrence since the Cold War. |
| `In' analytical Note | Astropolitics Vol. 7, No. 3; Sep-DEc 2009: p171-192 |
| Journal Source | Astropolitics Vol. 7, No. 3; Sep-DEc 2009: p171-192 |
| Key Words | Space Deterrence ; Space ; Cold War ; Satellites ; Crisis Management |