| ID | 096703 |
| Title Proper | Amritsar Massacre and the minimum force debate |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Lloyd, Nick |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article re-examines one of the most infamous incidents in British imperial history: the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, and analyses it within the context of the British Army's minimum force philosophy. The massacre has long been regarded as the most catastrophic failure of minimum force in the history of the British Army. This article reconsiders the arguments over the shooting at Amritsar and the role of Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, and questions the accepted view that the massacre was such a failure of minimum force. It argues that the circumstances surrounding the massacre must be understood before judging the incident and given these factors it is possible to see it within a minimum force framework. |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 21, No. 2; Jun 2010: p382-403 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 21, No. 2; Jun 2010: p382-403 |
| Key Words | Amritsar ; Minimum Force ; Aid to the Civil Power ; Indian Army ; Jallianwala Bagh |