| ID | 097096 |
| Title Proper | Counterinsurgency's impossible trilemma |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Zambernardi, Lorenzo |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Ever since the conventional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan turned into irregular conflicts, both students of war and practitioners have furiously debated counterinsurgency's logic, goals, and chances of success.1 Counterinsurgency doctrine, however, has experienced no radical change since its original development. It was originally, though not systematically, formulated in the twentieth century by none other than the British officer, T.E. Lawrence, and later extended, on the basis of the writings of Mao, by a variety of counterrevolutionary strategists such as the French theorists of la guerre revolutionnaire. Even the new counterinsurgency doctrine devised by General David Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan does not represent a fundamental shift away from its traditional understanding, which sees this type of conflict as a contest for the support and control of population and, in turn, places the security of the populace at the hub of military operations. |
| `In' analytical Note | Washington Quarterly Vol. 33, No. 3; Jul 2020: p.21 - 34 |
| Journal Source | Washington Quarterly Vol. 33, No. 3; Jul 2020: p.21 - 34 |
| Key Words | Counterinsurgency ; Conventional Wars ; Iraq ; Afghanistan ; Impossible Trilemma |