| ID | 098249 |
| Title Proper | Simulating terrorism |
| Other Title Information | credible commitment, costly signaling, and strategic behavior |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Siegel, David A ; Young, Joseph K |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | We present two simulations designed to convey the strategic nature of terrorism and counterterrorism. The first is a simulated hostage crisis, designed primarily to illustrate the concepts of credible commitment and costly signaling. The second explores high-level decision making of both a terrorist group and the state, and is designed to highlight scarce-resource allocation and organizational dynamics. The simulations should be useful both in a traditional classroom setting as well as to the larger public. We provide a primer on the subject matter, and all the material necessary to run the simulations. |
| `In' analytical Note | Political Science and Politics Vol. 42, No. 4; Oct 2009: p.765-771 |
| Journal Source | Political Science and Politics Vol. 42, No. 4; Oct 2009: p.765-771 |
| Key Words | Terrorism ; Simulating Terrorism ; Credible Commitment ; Strategic Behavior ; Counterterrorism |