Item Details
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:781Hits:20048552Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

In Basket
  Journal Article   Journal Article
 

ID099103
Title ProperImportance of actor cleavages in negotiating the European constitution
LanguageENG
AuthorHosli, Madeleine O ;  Arnold, Christine
Publication2010.
Summary / Abstract (Note)This paper aims to explore government preferences and cleavages in the bargaining process on the European Constitution, across the range of 25 EU member states. The study focuses on preferences concerning socioeconomic policymaking and explores whether divisions can be discerned between preferences held by actors according to locations on the left-right policy scale, actors in older as compared to newer EU states, net EU budget positions, domestic rates of support for European integration, and smaller as compared to larger states. The analysis also controls for possible external effects, such as recent domestic macroeconomic developments. Negotiations on the European Constitution are found to be determined less by general transnational left-right divisions, but cleavages according to the length of EU membership and the size of EU member states.
`In' analytical NoteInternational Studies Quarterly Vol. 54, No. 3; Sep 2010: p.615-632
Journal SourceInternational Studies Quarterly Vol. 54, No. 3; Sep 2010: p.615-632
Key WordsEuropean Constitution ;  Negotiation ;  Socioeconomic ;  Policy Makers


 
 
Media / Other Links  Full Text