| ID | 100931 |
| Title Proper | Congressional intelligence oversight |
| Other Title Information | the electoral disconnection |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Zegart, Amy ; Quinn, Julie |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article seeks to reconcile congressional oversight models in theory with oversight realities in intelligence. For nearly three decades, political scientists have argued that Congress controls the bureaucracy - and in surprisingly efficient ways. Yet the history of intelligence oversight suggests the opposite. We take a fresh look at the logic and empirics of police patrol and fire alarm models and find that neither explains intelligence oversight well. Both rely on assumptions, such as the presence of strong and plentiful interest groups, which characterize domestic policy but not US intelligence policy. Our data - comparing committee hearing activities, legislative productivity, and interest groups across different policy domains between 1985 and 2005 - reveal that oversight varies dramatically by policy issue, and that intelligence almost always ranks at the bottom. Ironically, the same electoral incentives that generate robust oversight in some policy areas turn out to be far weaker in intelligence. |
| `In' analytical Note | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 25, No. 6; Dec 2010: p. 744 - 766 |
| Journal Source | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 25, No. 6; Dec 2010: p. 744 - 766 |
| Key Words | Congressional Intelligence ; Electoral Disconnection ; Political Scientists ; US Intelligence Policy |