| ID | 100940 |
| Title Proper | Germany's small war in Afghanistan |
| Other Title Information | military learning amid politico-strategic inertia |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Noetzel, Timo |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The article analyzes the operational conduct of German forces in northern Afghanistan and the making of German strategy in the context of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since the expansion of the Afghan insurgency to northern Afghanistan in 2007. It is argued that the German contribution to ISAF is characterized by a severe mismatch between politico-strategic planning and decision-making in Berlin on the one hand and operational conduct and requirements on the ground on the other. Since 2007, however, politico-strategic insistence that the German engagement in Afghanistan constitutes a contribution to a post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction effort is steadily eroding. Analysis of German operational conduct in northern Afghanistan makes evident the existing mismatch between strategy and operations, but also reveals that the deterioration of the security situation on the ground has lead to a bottom-up-development of counterinsurgency doctrine, capabilities, institutions, and modus of operandi. Operations have been driving the making of German strategy, not vice-versa, which has severely hampered German efforts to counter insurgents' progress in the north of Afghanistan. |
| `In' analytical Note | Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 31, No. 3; Dec 2010: p.486 - 508 |
| Journal Source | Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 31, No. 3; Dec 2010: p.486 - 508 |
| Key Words | Germany ; Small War ; Afghanistan ; Afghan Insurgency ; Counterinsurgency ; Military Learning |