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ID100948
Title ProperBurden sharing in the funding of the UNHCR
Other Title Informationrefugee protection as an impure public good
LanguageENG
AuthorRoper, Steven ;  Barria, Lilian A
Publication2010.
Summary / Abstract (Note)The authors apply the theory of collective action and alliance behavior first developed by Olson and Zeckhauser and later extended by Sandler in a series of studies to test whether the nature of refugee protection influences state motivations to provide contributions. The authors investigate whether refugee protection can be viewed as a pure public good with the concomitant problem of free riding leading to suboptimal outcomes or whether contributions provide states private benefits that transform the nature of the good. Using a Heckman selection model, they test for the determinants of state contributions to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and find that refugee protection offers several private benefits, indicating that it is best understood as an impure public good. They conclude, however, that even when states are able to secure these private benefits, it does not necessarily lead to the optimal provision of refugee protection.
`In' analytical NoteJournal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 54, No. 4; Aug 2010: p616-637
Journal SourceJournal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 54, No. 4; Aug 2010: p616-637
Key WordsUNHCR ;  Refugee Protection ;  Public Goods ;  Burden Sharing ;  Funding ;  Refugee


 
 
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