| ID | 101076 |
| Title Proper | Tow decades of minimum deterrence in south Asia |
| Other Title Information | a comparative framework |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Basrur, Rajesh M |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | review of two decades of the India-Pakistan nuclear relationship shows that, like all nuclear rivalries, deterrence works at a minimal level regardless of beliefs about the requirements of deterrence. Also, like other nuclear rivalries, it displays a fundamentally schizophrenic behaviour pattern. When conflict draws close, India and Pakistan completely reject the usability of nuclear weapons and ignore the tenets of deterrence theory and doctrine; but when conflict is distant, they tend to behave as if the weapons are usable, which influences their doctrines and weapons acquisitions. The India-Pakistan case reveals a relatively cost-effective and risk-resistant minimalism, but is distorted by powerful elements of thinking-typified by the writings of Albert Wohlstetter-that has produced an arms race and a significant element of instability into the relationship |
| `In' analytical Note | India Review Vol. 9, No. 3; Jul-Sep 2010: p300-318 |
| Journal Source | India Review Vol: 9 No 3 |
| Key Words | South Asia ; India ; Pakistan ; India - Pakistan - Nuclear Rivalry |