| ID | 101125 |
| Title Proper | US intelligence and Vietnam |
| Other Title Information | the official version(s) |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Warner, Michael |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Recent declassifications of the official histories of Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency activities in the Vietnam War give historians a sharper outline of the overall American intelligence effort in that conflict and a trove of supporting details. While scholars will have to use the new releases with caution, the histories (when combined with appraisals from the Armed Services) offer glimpses of the scale of the US intelligence program and some of the complications that hindered its effectiveness. Two particular features stand out when these materials are viewed in conjunction: the disconnectedness of the various agencies' and Services' efforts from each other (and from decision makers in Washington); and the difficulties that all of them had in working with America's South Vietnamese allies. The picture emerging is thus one of a congeries of largely independent intelligence campaigns working simultaneously against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong targets. Intelligence miscues did not lose the Vietnam War for the Americans and South Vietnamese, but it now seems clearer that they made victory less likely. |
| `In' analytical Note | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 25, No. 5; Oct 2010: p611-637 |
| Journal Source | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 25, No. 5; Oct 2010: p611-637 |
| Key Words | US - Intelligence ; United States ; Intelligence ; Vietnam ; National Security ; America ; Vietnam War |