| ID | 101377 |
| Title Proper | Bilateralism or multilateralism |
| Other Title Information | the political economy of avoiding international double taxation |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Rixen, Thomas |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Why do states cooperate bilaterally or multilaterally? This article addresses the issue using the example of international double tax avoidance. It is argued that double tax avoidance exhibits the strategic structure of a coordination game with a distributive conflict. The distribution of tax revenues depends on the asymmetry of investment flows between treaty partners. Since investment flows are defined dyadically, bilateral bargaining can best accommodate countries' concerns for the distribution of tax revenues and other economic benefits connected to the tax base. Moreover, because there are no serious externality problems with bilateral agreement, this solution is also viable. At the same time, there is a need for a multilateral organization to disseminate information and shared practices in the form of a model convention that provides a focal point for bilateral negotiations. This solution minimizes transaction costs. Since agreements are self-enforcing in coordination games there is no need for third-party enforcement. Instead, the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) is a device to address problems of incomplete contracting. |
| `In' analytical Note | European Journal of International Relations Vol. 16, No. 4; Dec 2010: p589-614 |
| Journal Source | European Journal of International Relations Vol. 16, No. 4; Dec 2010: p589-614 |
| Key Words | Bilateralism ; Coordination ; Distribution ; Multilateralism ; Rational Institutional Design ; Taxation |