| ID | 101387 |
| Title Proper | Democratic differences |
| Other Title Information | electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO agreements |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Rickard, Stephanie J |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | A growing body of literature argues that democracies are more likely to comply with international agreements than authoritarian states. However, substantial variation exists in the compliance behaviour of democracies. How can this variation be explained? The same mechanism that links regime type to compliance, namely electoral competition, also explains variation in compliance among democracies. This is because the nature of electoral competition varies across democratic systems. An analysis of democratic GATT/WTO member countries from 1980 to 2003 reveals that governments elected via majoritarian electoral rules and/or single-member districts are more likely to violate GATT/WTO agreements than those elected via proportional electoral rules and/or multi-member districts. |
| `In' analytical Note | European Journal of International Relations Vol. 16, No. 4; Dec 2010: p711-729 |
| Journal Source | European Journal of International Relations Vol. 16, No. 4; Dec 2010: p711-729 |
| Key Words | Compliance ; DemocracyC ; Electoral rules ; GATT/WTO ; International Agreements ; WTO ; GATT |