| ID | 103899 |
| Title Proper | Is it possible and preferable to negotiate with terrorists? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Miller, Carl |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | It has been a staple assumption that terrorists 'do not want a place at the table: they want to shatter the table'. Across policymakers, academia and a wider commentariat, this position - that negotiation with the 'new' Islamist terrorist actor is both impossible and, anyway, highly undesirable - is so commonplace that the question has scarcely been raised. But is it true? The article considers the five pillars on which the no-negotiation position rests. First, 'rationality': are terrorists pathologically mad or fanatical? Second, 'viability': are there common interests or is this a zero-sum game? Third, 'representation': can terrorists fit into a diplomatic system recognising representative parties? Fourth, 'legitimacy': can diplomacy, as a system of norms, conventions and practices be applied to agents who reject this system wholesale? Fifth, 'preferability': even if possible, is it either strategically or ethically right to do so? The case on this question should not be closed yet. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence Studies Vol. 11, No. 1; Mar 2011: p.145 - 185 |
| Journal Source | Defence Studies Vol. 11, No. 1; Mar 2011: p.145 - 185 |
| Key Words | Terrorists ; Legitimacy ; Diplomacy ; Negotiation ; Islamist Terrorist |