| ID | 104443 |
| Title Proper | Betting on oil |
| Other Title Information | the world bank's attempt to promote accountability in Chad |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Winters, Matthew S ; Gould, John A |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Can international donors ensure that poor countries spend their natural resource revenues on development? This article reviews the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project and the World Bank's fourteen-year effort to foster pro-poor expenditure of resource revenues in Chad. The World Bank used its leverage as a gatekeeper of private sector oil investment to write fiscal restrictions and extragovernmental oversight into Chadian law. These efforts, however, were not sufficient to overcome the country's poor governance and weak political accountability. The article argues that external donor efforts to build better governance in undemocratic states are unlikely to overcome resource curse and obsolescing bargain dynamics. They may even do more harm than good. The article recommends that the World Bank implement the 2003 Extractive Industry Review suggestion to cease investing in oil production. If the Bank does continue to lend to countries like Chad, it must ensure that it retains leverage across the life of the project in order to achieve its goals. |
| `In' analytical Note | Global Governance Vol. 17, No. 2; Apr-Jun 2011: p229-245 |
| Journal Source | Global Governance Vol. 17, No. 2; Apr-Jun 2011: p229-245 |
| Key Words | Africa ; Chad ; Governance ; Resource Curse ; World Bank ; Oil |