| ID | 105204 |
| Title Proper | Biodefense and transparency |
| Other Title Information | the dual-use dilemma |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Bansak, Kirk C |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article assesses, via analysis of two case studies, the relationship between the dual-use nature of biological research and negative perceptions of the US biodefense program. The primary case study is the controversy over the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories, an as-yet-unopened maximum-containment biodefense facility in Boston that some locals suspect will be used for illegal offensive biological weapons (BW) work. Lessons from this controversy are considered in the international context via a second case study: the Cold War-era Soviet bioweapons program, which was continued in part due to the Soviet belief that the US biodefense program was really a cover for offensive BW work. The two case studies demonstrate that misperceptions of US biodefense can have serious consequences that may threaten US national security. Underlying such misperceptions is the unavoidable dilemma of dual-use-legitimate peaceful research and technologies can overlap with offensive military activities. Politics play a critical role in determining outsiders' interpretations of the intent of US biodefense activities, transforming the dual-use dilemma from a descriptive concept into a problem in which misperceptions can be highly damaging. Taking into account the important role of political relations, the article argues that negative perceptions of the US biodefense program should not be simply accepted as a fait accompli, intrinsic to the dual-use nature of the life sciences, but rather that they can and should be addressed. The article identifies greater transparency measures as crucial to doing this. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 18, No. 2; Jul 2011: p349-368 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 18, No. 2; Jul 2011: p349-368 |
| Key Words | Biological Weapons ; Toxin Weapons Convention ; United States ; Soviet Union |