| ID | 106123 |
| Title Proper | Hard currencies for hard times. terror attack and the choice of monetary anchors |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Sadeh, Tal |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | As terror's victims increase, hard currency commitments gain effectiveness in reducing inflation, and central bank independence loses its effectiveness, because terror reduces transparency and the number of veto players in domestic politics. PCSE (Panel-Corrected Standard Error) estimations of inflation are run on pooled cross-section time-series sample of 87 countries from 1975-2005. When the trend level rises to 100 victims annually a currency board reduces inflation by up to 7.5%, and an independent bank raises inflation by up to 8%. When victims exceptionally exceed the trend by 100, a currency board reduces inflation by 2.5%, and an independent bank raises it by 2%. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 22, No. 4; Aug 2011: p.367-392 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 22, No. 4; Aug 2011: p.367-392 |
| Key Words | Terror ; Currency Boards ; Central Banks ; Transparency |