Item Details
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:850Hits:19858395Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

In Basket
  Journal Article   Journal Article
 

ID106246
Title ProperContingent credibility
Other Title Informationthe impact of investment treaty violations on foreign direct investment
LanguageENG
AuthorAllee, Todd ;  Peinhardt, Clint
Publication2011.
Summary / Abstract (Note)During the past few decades governments have signed nearly 2,700 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with one another in an attempt to attract greater levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). By signing BITs, which contain strong enforcement provisions, investment-seeking governments are thought to more credibly commit to protecting whatever FDI they receive, which in turn should lead to increased confidence among investors and ultimately greater FDI inflows. Our unique argument is that the ability of BITs to increase FDI is contingent on the subsequent good behavior of the governments who sign them. BITs should increase FDI only if governments actually follow through on their BIT commitments; that is, if they comply with the treaties. BITs allow investors to pursue alleged treaty violations through arbitration venues like the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a heavily utilized and widely observed arbitral institution that is part of the World Bank. Being taken before ICSID, then, conveys negative information about a host country's behavior to the broader investment community, which could result in a sizeable loss of future FDI into that country. We test these contingent effects of BITs using cross-sectional, time-series analyses on all non-OECD countries during a period spanning 1984-2007. We find that BITs do increase FDI into countries that sign them, but only if those countries are not subsequently challenged before ICSID. On the other hand, governments suffer notable losses of FDI when they are taken before ICSID and suffer even greater losses when they lose an ICSID dispute.
`In' analytical NoteInternational Organization Vol. 65, No. 3; Summer 2011: p.401-432
Journal SourceInternational Organization Vol. 65, No. 3; Summer 2011: p.401-432
Key WordsInvestment Treaty Violations ;  Foreign Direct Investment ;  FDI ;  International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ;  ICSID


 
 
Media / Other Links  Full Text