| ID | 106602 |
| Title Proper | Little, too late |
| Other Title Information | the CIA and US counteraction of the Soviet initiative in the Six-day war, 1967 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Ginor, Isabella ; Remez, Gideon |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The authors' previous research has established that the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War resulted from a deliberate Soviet plan to provoke Israel into a pre-emptive strike, which would legitimize and trigger a massive Soviet military intervention to aid an Egyptian-Syrian counteroffensive. However, US documents released until recently provided no evidence that the American intelligence community, and particularly the CIA, detected this threat or informed the political leadership about it - even though some indications were picked up at the field level. A newly declassified, retrospective report appears for the first time to show that there was awareness of major components of the Soviet operation (preparations for a naval landing and parachute drop). But closer scrutiny finds that this report reflects Soviet propaganda more than factual intelligence - thus further tarnishing what has hitherto been held as an outstanding achievement for the Agency and its chief. |
| `In' analytical Note | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 26, No. 2-3; Apr-Jun 2011: p291-312 |
| Journal Source | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 26, No. 2-3; Apr-Jun 2011: p291-312 |
| Key Words | CIA ; Intelligence Agency ; Soviet ; America ; Intelligence ; Politics |