| ID | 106794 |
| Title Proper | How the high north became central in NATO strategy |
| Other Title Information | revelations from the NATO archives |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Dyndal, Gjert Lage |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the 'High North' constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his 'Maritime Strategy' studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of 'External Reinforcement of the Flanks' of 1968 - finally followed by the 'Brosio Study' (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's 'tactical northern flank' was set to become an independent strategic theatre. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 34, No. 4; Aug 2011: p557-585 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 34, No. 4; Aug 2011: p557-585 |
| Key Words | High North ; NATO Strategy ; Soviet Navy ; Air Force Developments ; Air Force |