| ID | 107159 |
| Title Proper | Why alliances entangle but seldom entrap states |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kim, Tongfi |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper explains one of the central roles of alliance contracts, the prevention of undesirable military entanglement. The existing literature on alliances argues that entrapment is a major concern for potential and actual alliance partners, but it is difficult to point out clear cases of entrapment. I provide two answers to this puzzle: First, entrapment is a narrower concept than others have realized, and it is rarer than the literature suggests. Second, leaders anticipate entrapment and carefully design alliance agreements before and after states form alliances. I examine the second argument through case studies of us alliance agreements with South Korea, Japan, and Spain. |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 20, No. 3; Jul-Sep 2011: p.350-377 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol. 20, No. 3; Jul-Sep 2011: p.350-377 |
| Key Words | Japan ; Spain ; Military Entanglement ; US Alliance |