| ID | 107551 |
| Title Proper | Dynamic Winner-take-all conflict |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Reuveny, Rafael ; Maxwell, John W ; Davis, Jefferson |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | We develop a model of repeated conflict that features probabilistic winner-take-all outcomes and compare its dynamics to the dynamics generated by a similar deterministic model in which combatants divide the conflict spoils. While these models generate the same behavior in a one-shot game, in a repeated setting the winner-take-all model generates richer dynamics than the dynamics generated by the deterministic model, which are new to the economics literature on conflict. As in real-world conflicts, the winner-take-all model generates changes in the relative dominance of combatants, full mobilization of fighting resources, and endogenous surrender. We evaluate the implications for the literature. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 22, No.5; Oct 2011: p.471-492 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 22, No.5; Oct 2011: p.471-492 |
| Key Words | Fog of War ; Paradox of Power ; Stochastic ; Deterministic |