| ID | 107574 |
| Title Proper | Hard to prove |
| Other Title Information | the verification quandary of the biological weapons convention |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Lentzos, Filippa |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How can compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) best be ensured? The verification quandary-the difficulty in providing a high level of assurance that each state party is fully complying with its treaty obligations-has troubled the BWC since its inception in 1972. This article considers past difficulties in negotiating compliance monitoring provisions-such as states' views on inspection procedures-and lays out short-, medium-, and long-term strategies to tackle what has been a very divisive issue. It argues that state parties should undertake conceptual discussions to develop common understandings on the most effective mechanisms to enhance compliance with the treaty, and that it will ultimately be up to state parties to demonstrate the political will necessary to develop measures to strengthen the BWC through effective compliance monitoring and verification measures, either through a new legally binding instrument or through building and augmenting existing provisions. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 18, No. 3; Nov 2011: p.571-582 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 18, No. 3; Nov 2011: p.571-582 |
| Key Words | Biological Weapons Convention ; Verification and Compliance ; Treaty Negotiations |