| ID | 107613 |
| Title Proper | Structure and stability reconsidered |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Roth, Ariel Ilan |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The argument that multipolar international systems are less stable because certain states have an incentive to externalize the costs of defense to other states has been built on interpretations of the behavior of France, Russia, and especially Great Britain between the two World Wars. This article addresses flaws in both the use of the French and Russian cases, but is most tightly focused on the British case, which was the strongest, prima facie, of the three. This article demonstrates how the British scheme for defense against Germany was not a policy of attempted externalization on either the political or military level. Consequently, the long debate over the relationship between systemic structure and systemic stability, which has been heavily influenced by the belief in the existence of an incentive to externalize defense costs under multipolarity, must be re-examined, with new tests run and new conclusions explored. |
| `In' analytical Note | European Journal of International Relations Vol. 17, No.3; Sep 2011: p.567-584 |
| Journal Source | European Journal of International Relations Vol. 17, No.3; Sep 2011: p.567-584 |
| Key Words | Balance of Power ; Bipolarity ; Classical Realism ; Multipolarity ; Polarity |