| ID | 107903 |
| Title Proper | Desert insurgency |
| Other Title Information | lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Emerson, Stephen A |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article provides an in-depth examination and analysis of the 2006-2009 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger. It identifies the underlying reasons behind the rebellion, explores contrasting counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies employed by the two governments, and presents some lessons learned. While both COIN approaches ultimately produced similar peace settlements, the article argues that the Malian strategy of reconciliation combined with the selective use of force was far more effective than the Nigerien iron fist approach at limiting the size and scope of the insurgency and producing a more sustainable peace. It concludes by looking at the role of external actors, particularly the United States, and how the failure to internationalize the conflict was actually more beneficial to the local COIN effort, as well as to the longer strategic interests of the United States in the region. |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 22, No. 4; Oct 2011: p.669-687 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 22, No. 4; Oct 2011: p.669-687 |
| Key Words | Africa ; Mali ; Niger ; Tuareg ; Rebellion ; Counter - Insurgency ; United States ; Terrorism |