| ID | 107947 |
| Title Proper | Accounting for blind spots |
| Other Title Information | from oedipus to democratic epistemology |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Button, Mark E |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This essay is concerned with the challenges that moral "blind spots" create for the presence and endurance of democratic virtues under conditions of pluralism. A moral blind spot refers to the occlusions in individual moral perceptions and the limits that circumscribe moral sympathies owing to our ineluctable partialities as socially embedded beings. Blind spots constitute a tragic feature of human perception and moral judgment that facilitate and undermine human agency at once. Yet, far more problematic from the perspective of democratic epistemology and normative ethics is the denial or willful forgetfulness of their place in our individual and collective lives, and the concomitant failure to account for moral blind spots so as to check their most pernicious effects. Accounting for moral blind spots in practice requires actively planning for their presence through the cultivation of the "pathos of distance" towards ourselves and our collective political identities and social institutions. |
| `In' analytical Note | Political Theory Vol. 39, No. 6; Dec 2011: p. 695-723 |
| Journal Source | Political Theory Vol. 39, No. 6; Dec 2011: p. 695-723 |
| Key Words | Oedipus ; Social psychology ; Nietzsche ; Democratic Epistemology |