| ID | 107969 |
| Title Proper | Dark side of altruistic third-party punishment |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Leibbrandt, Andreas ; Lopez-Perez, Raul |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article experimentally studies punishment from unaffected third parties in ten different games. The authors show that third-party punishment exhibits several features that are arguably undesirable. First, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses a socially efficient or a Pareto efficient allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Interestingly, this form of punishment is especially pronounced in women and more left-wing participants. Second, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses an equitable allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Finally, third parties considerably punish passive parties who make no choice, especially if the latter are richer than the third party. Implications of these findings for social theory are discussed. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 55, No. 5; Oct 2011: p.761-784 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 55, No. 5; Oct 2011: p.761-784 |
| Key Words | Altruistic Punishment ; Efficiency ; Inequity - Aversion ; Third Parties |