| ID | 108254 |
| Title Proper | Blundering into Baghdad |
| Other Title Information | an analysis of strategy, structure, principals and agents |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Borer, Douglas A ; Twing, Stephen W |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Some postmortems of the Bush Administration's pre-Iraq war decision-making have focused on a dysfunctional National Security Council (NSC) structure as the major reason for the lack of a thorough strategic assessment prior to the March 2003 invasion. Other academic and journalistic accounts have focused on a lack of a first rate conceptual thinker at the top levels of the Bush Administration as an important cause of the strategic shortcomings in Iraq decision-making. This article will assess the relative impact of decision-making structure versus quality of strategic leadership in explaining poor performance in the first five years of the Iraq war. |
| `In' analytical Note | Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol. 24, No. 3; Sep 2011: p.493-512 |
| Journal Source | Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol. 24, No. 3; Sep 2011: p.493-512 |
| Key Words | Baghdad ; Bush Administration ; National Security Council (NSC) ; Iraq War ; Strategic Leadership |