| ID | 109958 |
| Title Proper | More complex and conventional victory |
| Other Title Information | revisiting the Dhofar counterinsurgency, 1963-1975 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | DeVore, Marc R |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Following the emergence of a communist regime in South Yemen and the multiplication of subversive movements in the United Kingdom's Gulf protectorates, British policymakers genuinely feared the spread of communism throughout southern Arabia. Defeating the People's Front for the Liberation for the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) insurgency in Oman's Dhofar province was considered central to preventing such an outcome. In their pursuit of victory, British officers overthrew the sultan of Oman, escalated the war by conducting attacks in South Yemen, and, ultimately, appealed to Islam as a means of rallying support against communism. However, lessons learned in previous counterinsurgencies (Malaya, Kenya, and Borneo) proved of only limited value in Oman's physical and cultural environment. Unfortunately, none of these measures worked as anticipated. Only Iran's direct military intervention and the dramatic growth of Oman's financial resources after the 1973 oil crisis provided the resources to conduct large-scale offensive operations. Even so, victory was only achieved in 1975 because the rebellion's leaders unwisely attempted to oppose the Anglo-Omani offensives conventionally. |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 23, No.1; Mar 2012: p. 144-173 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 23, No.1; Mar 2012: p. 144-173 |
| Key Words | Counterinsurgency ; Insurgency ; Hearts and Minds ; United Kingdom ; Oman ; Dhofar ; Iran ; Persian Gulf ; Cold War |