| ID | 110006 |
| Title Proper | Does terrorism really work? evolution in the conventional wisdom since 9/11 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Abrahms, Max |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The basic narrative of bargaining theory predicts that, all else equal, anarchy favors concessions to challengers who demonstrate the will and ability to escalate against defenders. For this reason, post-9/11 political science research explained terrorism as rational strategic behavior for non-state challengers to induce government compliance given their constraints. Over the past decade, however, empirical research has consistently found that neither escalating to terrorism nor with terrorism helps non-state actors to achieve their demands. In fact, escalating to terrorism or with terrorism increases the odds that target countries will dig in their political heels, depriving the non-state challengers of their given preferences. These empirical findings across disciplines, methodologies, as well as salient global events raise important research questions, with implications for counterterrorism strategy. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 22, No. 6; Dec 2011: p.583-594 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 22, No. 6; Dec 2011: p.583-594 |
| Key Words | Terrorism ; Bargaining Theory ; 9/11 ; Non - State Actors ; Counterterrorism Strategy |