| ID | 110560 |
| Title Proper | Collective action with uncertain payoffs |
| Other Title Information | coordination, public signals, and punishment dilemmas |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Shadmehr, Mehdi ; Bernhardt, Dan |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How can one analyze collective action in protests or revolutions when individuals are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution? We model a "calculus of protest" of individuals who must either submit to the status quo or support revolt based only on personal information about their payoffs. In deciding whether to revolt, the citizen must infer both the benefit of successful revolution and the likely actions of other citizens. We characterize conditions under which payoff uncertainty overturns conventional wisdom: (a) when a citizen is too willing to revolt, he reduces the incentives of others to revolt; (b) less accurate information about the value of revolution can make revolt more likely; (c) public signals from other citizens can reduce the likelihood of revolt; (d) harsher punishment can increase the incidence of punishment; and (e) the incidence of protest can be positively correlated with that of repression. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 105, No. 4; Nov 2011: p. 829-851 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review Vol. 105, No. 4; Nov 2011: p. 829-851 |
| Key Words | Collective Action ; Coordination ; Public Signals ; Punishment Dilemmas |