| ID | 110781 |
| Title Proper | Enforcement-exploitation trade-off in international cooperation between weak and powerful states |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Urpelainen, Johannes |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | According to the imperative of enforcement, states must threaten defectors with sanctions or reciprocal suspension of international cooperation. I show that in international cooperation between the weak and the powerful, states should nevertheless limit the supply of collective enforcement power. Strong sanctions allow exploitative international agreements, so weak states refuse to engage in negotiations with powerful states in the first place. For powerful states, toothless international agreements are a credible commitment to limit power politics. The result holds even if sanctions can be used only to enforce international agreements and not for coercion. It implies that under power asymmetry, states must accept constraints on the use of power, as opposed to simply maximizing the supply of collective enforcement power. The theory offers a new perspective to international cooperation and a synthesis of the enforcement and managerial schools of international cooperation. It produces precise analytical boundary conditions and generates falsifiable empirical hypotheses. |
| `In' analytical Note | European Journal of International Relations Vol. 17, No.4; Dec 2011: p.631-653 |
| Journal Source | European Journal of International Relations Vol. 17, No.4; Dec 2011: p.631-653 |
| Key Words | Compliance ; Game Theory ; International Cooperation ; International Institutions ; Power Asymmetry |