ID | 111150 |
Title Proper | Managing global counterinsurgency |
Other Title Information | the special group (CI) 1962-1966 |
Language | ENG |
Author | Michaels, Jeffrey H |
Publication | 2012. |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | The contemporary American counterinsurgency discourse has emphasised a particular historical narrative of Vietnam to justify large-scale military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent from this narrative is any reference to the broader Cold War context in which Vietnam existed alongside numerous other small-scale counterinsurgencies and was therefore the exception, not the rule. This article seeks to redress this shortcoming by examining the way counterinsurgency was conceived and managed at the level of 'grand strategy.' Specifically, it focuses on the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) to demonstrate that senior policymakers under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson understood 'counterinsurgency' as involving 'indirect' assistance to foreign governments, rather than taking 'direct' military action with American ground forces. |
`In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 35, No.1; Feb 2012: p.33-61 |
Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 35, No.1; Feb 2012: p.33-61 |
Key Words | Counterinsurgency ; Special Group ; Grand Strategy |