| ID | 111886 |
| Title Proper | Outflanking missile defences |
| Other Title Information | the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, nuclear weapons and terrorism |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Bellany, Ian |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In the past, terrorists have tended to eschew acts of extreme violence for fear of alienating those whom they wish to persuade and attract to their cause. The first to discard this philosophy was the Aum group in Japan, which sought to use anthrax and acquire a nuclear weapon. Since then, attitudes have changed, spurred on by the impact on public perception of the successful Al Qaeda 9/11 attack on New York and Washington. By crossing the line between moderation and extreme violence, terrorist groups retain one valuable capability: they are much less easily deterred and have few inhibitions. This article considers the three nuclear options open to terrorists - produce a radiological contaminant bomb; build a nuclear bomb; or steal or get given a nuclear device. It examines the possibilities and probabilities of each option and considers how the implementation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) provisions might impose some constraints on terrorists' nuclear ambitions. By examining the doubtful nuclear security practices of different states and providing statistical evidence of an increase in levels of international terrorist violence, this article points to determined terrorists in time acquiring the means to acquire one or other variants of a nuclear weapon. It concludes that it is not a matter of "if" but "when." |
| `In' analytical Note | Defense and Security Analysis Vol. 28, No.1; Mar 2012: p. 81-96 |
| Journal Source | Defense and Security Analysis Vol. 28, No.1; Mar 2012: p. 81-96 |
| Key Words | Terrorism ; Nuclear Weapons ; NPT ; Violence ; Uranium ; Dirty Bombs |