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ID111889
Title ProperInsurgent-populace relations in Nepal
Other Title Informationan analysis of attitudinal and behavioural support
LanguageENG
AuthorKhalil, James
Publication2012.
Summary / Abstract (Note)The first objective of this article is to provide conceptual clarity regarding the term 'support' in the context of insurgent campaigns. While it is commonly claimed that insurgent and counterinsurgent forces compete for the support of the populace, there is often ambiguity as to whether this refers to a voluntary preference for a group of armed actors (attitudinal support), or a set of actions that provide direct benefits to one of these groups (behavioural support or collaboration). Furthermore, while a number of academics and practitioners focus upon the former on the assumption that it translates into the latter with sufficient consistency (Lawrence 'of Arabia', Mao, etc.), others maintain a contradictory stance (Kilcullen, Kalyvas, etc.). The findings from research undertaken into the 1996-2006 conflict in Nepal suggest a more complex reality in that certain forms of collaboration (e.g. provisions of information) seemingly necessitate supportive attitudes to a greater extent than others (e.g. supplies of food). The second objective is to evaluate the various approaches used by the Maoist insurgents to generate these distinct forms of support. While their ideology largely failed to resonate with the populace, attitudinal support was obtained through various 'popular appeals', including land reform, an opposition to an increasingly repressive monarchy, and campaigns to empower certain marginalised sectors of society. In contrast, the development initiatives of the Maoists, and their nationalist rhetoric in opposition to US and Indian influence were substantially less effective. Each of these initiatives were undertaken to obtain collaboration via attitudinal support, but the former was also generated directly through the use of coercion against specific non-combatants.
`In' analytical NoteSmall Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 23, No.2; May 2012: p.221-244
Journal SourceSmall Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 23, No.2; May 2012: p.221-244
Key WordsNepal ;  Mao ;  Maoist ;  Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) ;  Insurgent ;  Insurgency ;  Support ;  Coercion


 
 
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