| ID | 111894 |
| Title Proper | Squad leaders today, village leaders tomorrow |
| Other Title Information | Muslim auxiliaries and tactical politics in Algeria, 1956-1962 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Orwin, Ethan M |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | From 1956 to 1960, the French Army developed a force of Muslim auxiliaries (supplétifs) as a major component of its strategy to combat the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgency in Algeria. Aside from their military utility in hunting down the guerrillas in the mountains and forests, the supplétifs were instrumental in undermining FLN legitimacy in the countryside. The rapid growth and employment of the supplétif force dismantled FLN political control in the villages, undermined the enemy's unity, and critically weakened the revolutionaries' claim to represent all of Algeria's Muslims. The military and political activities of France's Muslim soldiers also projected an image of Muslim-European unity behind the French cause, and portrayed the French Army as the only legitimate political force in numerous villages. These political successes, however, were limited to the local, tactical level of revolutionary warfare, and the Army was never able to convert the supplétifs into a force of decisive, strategic political significance. They thus had little ultimate impact on the outcome of the conflict. |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 23, No.2; May 2012: p.330-351 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 23, No.2; May 2012: p.330-351 |
| Key Words | ALN ; Algiers Putsch ; Challe ; de Gaulle ; FLN ; Guerre Revolutionnaire ; Kobus Affair ; Mobile Security Groups ; Republican Security Companies ; Saida ; Suppletifs ; Third Force |