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ID111904
Title ProperStrategic voting and effective representation thresholds
Other Title Informationevidence from three Spanish general elections
LanguageENG
AuthorVinuela, Enrique Garcia ;  Artes, Joaquin
Publication2012.
Summary / Abstract (Note)The extent of strategic voting in the Spanish general elections of 2000, 2004 and 2008 is estimated using a new measure of strategic incentives suitable for proportional representation systems that avoids some of the problems associated with lagged variables. Strategic behaviour increased from 12 to 33 per cent of the electoral base of the United Left Party, the major victim of strategic defection. This estimate is a conservative one as elite mobilisation is controlled for in the constituencies, which is unusual in the literature on strategic voting that uses regression-based methods.
`In' analytical NoteEuropean Journal of Political Research Vol. 51, No.3; May 2012: p.289-315
Journal SourceEuropean Journal of Political Research Vol. 51, No.3; May 2012: p.289-315
Key WordsStrategic Voting ;  Proportional Representation Systems ;  Elite Mobilisation ;  Spanish Elections