| ID | 112780 |
| Title Proper | UN intervention and the duration of international crises |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Beardsley, Kyle |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article examines the effect of UN actions on the duration of international crises. Four different types of action - assurance, diplomatic engagement, military involvement, and intimidation - and three different outcomes - compromise, victory, and stalemate - are considered. After building on the existing literature to develop expectations of how a third party like the UN shapes crisis trajectories, hypotheses are tested using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data and a new events dataset on UN activity. Results from competing-risks models reveal that UN military involvement does well to decrease the risk of one side achieving victory, and diplomatic engagement increases the ability of the belligerents to reach a compromise in the long run. Moreover, diplomatic engagement accompanied by military involvement substantially hastens the pace of stalemate outcomes. Both tactics, however, have some trade-offs. Military involvement can decrease the sense of urgency for compromise; diplomatic engagement can be used for insincere motives and increase the risk of one-sided victory over time. UN actions of assurance and simple intimidation have considerable shortcomings as crisis management vehicles. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Peace Research Vol. 49, No.2; Mar 2012: p.335-349 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Peace Research Vol. 49, No.2; Mar 2012: p.335-349 |
| Key Words | Conflict Resolution ; Event History ; International Crisis Behavior ; Matching ; United Nations |