| ID | 112877 |
| Title Proper | Purchasing power |
| Other Title Information | oil, elections and regime durability in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kendall-Taylor, Andrea |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article examines the link between oil abundance and regime durability by providing insight into how and why oil-rich leaders use elections to maintain power. Using data from presidential elections in Central Asia, the article argues that oil-rich leaders are better able to manipulate their economies in the run-up to elections than their resource-poor counterparts. Oil-rich leaders use oil profits to increase pre-electoral spending to increase popular support, to deter potential opposition and to secure elite loyalty. Such electorally timed increases in spending help oil-rich leaders increase their re-election prospects and ensure their continued control over their countries' resources. |
| `In' analytical Note | Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 64, No.4; Jun 2012: p.737-760 |
| Journal Source | Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 64, No.4; Jun 2012: p.737-760 |
| Key Words | Purchasing Power ; Oil ; Elections ; Azerbaijan ; Kazakhstan ; Central Asia |