| ID | 113305 |
| Title Proper | Strategic adaptation to new electoral systems |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Selb, Peter |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How quickly, to what extent and under what conditions do voters and elites adapt to new electoral institutions in order to not waste their votes and effort on hopeless competitors? A latent-curve model of strategic adaptation is developed and fitted to district-level election data from Spain. The extent of strategic adaptation is generally found to vary with the strength of the electoral system. However, grave ethnic tensions are demonstrated to seriously retard adaptation even under favourable institutional conditions. |
| `In' analytical Note | European Journal of Political Research Vol. 51, No.5; Aug 2012: p.583-606 |
| Journal Source | European Journal of Political Research Vol. 51, No.5; Aug 2012: p.583-606 |
| Key Words | Electoral Coordination ; Strategic Voting ; Dynamics ; Spain |