| ID | 113952 |
| Title Proper | Unilateral influence on international bureaucrats |
| Other Title Information | an international delegation problem |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Urpelainen, Johannes |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The conventional wisdom emphasizes agency slack or bias as the central problem of international delegation. I show that the possibility of a unilateral influence contest is equally problematic. States can exert unilateral influence on autonomous international bureaucrats, either through rewards or through punishments, to pursue their particular interests. A costly contest results, so some states could refuse to delegate because they expect others to be too influential. The analysis has four counterintuitive empirical implications. First, international agreements often favor institutionally weak states that are disadvantaged in the unilateral influence contest. Second, states could limit the autonomy of an international organization even if this prompts bad policies. Third, a state can sometimes profitably exchange distributional concessions for autonomy. Finally, constraints on unilateral influence are possible only if a disadvantaged state can credibly commit to compensating an advantaged state for it. A central broader contribution of the analysis is to show how power politics influences the rational design of international institutions. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 56, No.4; Aug 2012: p.704-735 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 56, No.4; Aug 2012: p.704-735 |
| Key Words | International Institutions ; International Organizations ; Principal - Agent Theory ; Power Politics ; Informal Governance |