| ID | 114250 |
| Title Proper | Red team |
| Other Title Information | how the neoconservatives helped cause the Iraq intelligence failure |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Conway, Patrick |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article explains how flawed intelligence assessments of Iraq's aluminum tubes became 'Exhibit A' in the Bush administration's case for the Iraq War. The assessments seem to have begun as a consequence of a debate within the administration over US Iraq policy in early 2001. The neoconservatives wanted intelligence that would help them argue for regime-change. A WINPAC 'Red Team' analyst analyzed the tubes using the same methodology as 1976's infamous Team B panel, which skewed intelligence to support neoconservative policies. The Red Team analyst erroneously concluded the tubes were for a nuclear program thus countering assessments that they had a non-nuclear purpose. After the attacks of September 11 and President Bush's embrace of regime-change, the Red Team tubes assessment began to become the official position of the Intelligence Community. In September 2002, the President cited the assessment publicly, forcing the Intelligence Community to adopt it as the majority position in the Iraq NIE. 'Exhibit A' in the case for war was thus the product of a Red Team and, as such, was essentially propaganda masquerading as intelligence. |
| `In' analytical Note | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 27, No.4; Aug 2012: p.488-512 |
| Journal Source | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 27, No.4; Aug 2012: p.488-512 |
| Key Words | Intelligence Assessments ; Iraq War ; US Iraq policy - 2001 ; Red Team ; United States ; Iraq |