| ID | 114258 |
| Title Proper | Soviet invasion of Afghanistan |
| Other Title Information | international reactions, military intelligence and British diplomacy |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Dimitrakis, Panagiotis |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | From the outset the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was strongly condemned by Britain and all the other NATO member states, by the non-aligned group and by key countries in Asia and the Middle East. During the first days following the invasion, London worked for the speedy build-up of a diplomatic consensus, while the Carter administration was still in a state of surprise and some confusion. It is evident that the single factor that led many countries to join forces diplomatically was the fear of further Soviet adventurism in Asia and the Middle East; uninformed, alarmist assessments of Soviet intentions played a major part in cementing a diplomatic coalition, which led to the condemnation of Moscow in the UN General Assembly - predictably, the Soviets had vetoed a Security Council resolution. Simply put, the fear of war led to something of a panic among non-aligned nations, which in turn convinced them to back western diplomacy. |
| `In' analytical Note | Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 48, No.4; Jul 2012: p.511-536 |
| Journal Source | Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 48, No.4; Jul 2012: p.511-536 |
| Key Words | Afghanistan ; Soviet Invasion ; Middle East ; Diplomatic Consensus ; NATO ; Britain ; Asia ; Soviet Adventurism ; Diplomacy |