| ID | 114622 |
| Title Proper | Pearl Harbour |
| Other Title Information | as viewed through a different lens |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Pereira, V |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | At 0749 hours on Sunday, December 07, 1941, the Japanese launched
the first of two waves of attacks against American facilities at Pearl
Harbour, Hawaii; the second wave of aircraft arrived at 0900 hours.
The first wave consisted of 183 Japanese dive/torpedo bombers
accompanied by 'Zero' fighter escorts, whilst the second wave
consisted of 168 aircraft similar in nature/composition to the first
wave. Eighteen operational warships, including four battleships, were
sunk or badly damaged, 188 aircraft were destroyed, 2,403 Americans
were killed (including civilians) and 1,178 were wounded.
1
Although
it could be said that the Japanese achieved local and tactical surprise,
the American losses in the attack could have been much worse had it
not been for the fact that three aircraft carriers were not in port, nine
cruisers and virtually all of the destroyers remained afloat, and none of
the fleet's submarines was lost. The possible extent of American losses
were further limited by the fact that Adm Nagumo, the commander
of the Japanese task force, refused to authorise a third wave of attack
that could possibly have led to the calamitous destruction of the naval
dockyards and oil storage tanks; the loss of which would have placed
severe restraints on the use of Pearl Harbour as a forward base for counter-offensives against Japanese advances towards the Philippines,
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. The attack solved President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's most pressing problem at the time - how to
overcome American public opposition to involvement in a war that
was ongoing in Europe for the previous year and a half. It is a known
fact that over 80 per cent of the American population (at least on the
eve of Pearl Harbour) was not in favour of the US entering the war
as an active participant. Roosevelt obtained overwhelming majority
support when he asked Congress for a 'declaration of war' against
Japan after the attack on Pearl Harbour. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Diplomacy Vol. 1, No.3; Apr-Jun 2012: p.37-47 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Diplomacy Vol. 1, No.3; Apr-Jun 2012: p.37-47 |
| Key Words | Pearl Harbour ; Japan ; America ; Churchill ; Political Leadership |